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Question 
• What evidence is there for what works to maintain essential state functions and basic 
service delivery in escalating conflict situations? Focus on modalities and lessons from 
contexts like Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria. 
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This rapid literature review explores how to maintain essential state functions and basic service 
delivery during escalating conflict situations. It draws on literatures and ideas from various 
overlapping agendas including: development and humanitarian nexus; development, 
humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus (the “triple nexus”); fragile states; state-building; conflict 
sensitivity; resilience; and conflict prevention and early warning. There has been extensive 
exploration of these ideas over the past decades: as the international development agenda has 
increasingly focussed on the needs of fragile and conflict affected contexts (FCAS); as violent 
conflicts have become more complex and protracted; as the global share of poverty has become 
increasingly concentrated in FCAS highlighting the need to combine humanitarian crisis 
strategies with longer-term development strategies; as threats emanating from FCAS 
increasingly affect countries beyond those states and regions e.g. through serious and organised 
crime (SOC) networks, migration, terrorism, etc; and as global trends like climate change and 
demographic shifts create new stresses, opportunities, and risks (OECD, 2020; Ingram & 
Papoulidis, 2018; United Nations (UN) & World Bank, 2018; Ozano & Martineau, 2018).  
Yet despite these extensive debates, the literature base is limited in various ways, e.g. there are 
limited practical examples of when humanitarian and development principles have been bridged 
in practice (Ozano & Martineau, 2018, p.2), and there is limited understanding of the variability of 
outcomes across different contexts – e.g. of service delivery in violence-affected contexts (World 
Bank, 2017). Much of the current literature focuses on the how (i.e. the strategies and modalities 
for engagement), and not on the what (i.e. thematic areas to prioritise), possibly as a response to 
calls for programming to be better context derived.  
Some of the key lessons from these agendas have remained steadfast, and gained traction, over 
time – such as the importance of context specificity and conflict sensitivity in responses, and the 
need for better coordination and integration to overcome silos between development, 
humanitarian and development actors. While there are also evolutions and innovations in the 
agendas, as lessons emerge, and as political agendas and interests change in the host and 
donor countries – such as more recent trends of resilience thinking, complexity, and adaptive 
programming. The FCAS group is fairly broad, and this query focusses on countries that have 
particularly protracted contexts, including Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, as well as 
including higher-level analysis on broad principles for engagement in FCAS. Overarchingly, 
these contexts are extremely complex, and while common trends can be identified, generalisable 
lessons are much more difficult to discern (United Nations & World Bank, 2018). The literature 
used for this query is predominantly from practitioner and policy publishers, due to the applied 
nature of the question. As this question covers such a broad range of issues, this query cannot 
be considered conclusive, but is instead illustrative of some of the main findings, lessons, and 
trends from recent debates.  
Key findings 
The development, humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus - Debates about how to better 
connect activities across these sectors have emerged since the 1990s and continue to expand, 
in-line with broader changes in international development and foreign policy agendas. In 
situations of escalating conflict and fragility, development programming is typically diminished in 
favour of humanitarian programming, yet new debates emphasise the importance of prioritising 
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“prevention always, development when possible and humanitarian action when necessary” 
(OECD, 2020, p.17). International actors (particularly the UN) are responding to this age-old 
challenge of coordination and integration through piloting a new approach - the ‘New Way of 
Working’ - and through frameworks to coordinate aid, strategy, resource mobilisation, and 
programming with other actors (e.g. country platforms, joint assessments; compacts; etc). Core 
lessons emerging from the use of country platforms and compacts includes the importance of: 
context; country ownership and participation; good understanding of (national, sub-national and 
international) capacities; support for compacts from leadership; balancing prioritisation and focus 
with vision and achievability; specific, concrete, monitorable and balanced commitments; two-
sided mutual accountability; the inclusion of specific actions in compact strategies; and 
understanding that while compacts generally improve coordination, it can come with high 
transaction costs (Manuel, McKechnie, Wilson & das Pradhan-Blach, 2017, p.12). Specific 
lessons from Afghanistan and Somalia are detailed in section 2.  
A new fragile states paradigm? The fragile states agenda is undergoing what looks to be a 
paradigm shift to include ideas of resilience, risk and vulnerabilities; prevention; complexity; and 
adaptive management. A key aspect of this is the acknowledgment of the centrality of politics - a 
key response to the critique that the fragile states agenda was too technocratic. 
The resilience agenda - Resilience thinking is now a key framework through which to 
understand: why some societies are particularly vulnerable to violence (the so-called fragility-to-
resilience paradigm); the complex, multiple connections between conflict, crises, disasters, and 
poverty; the importance of risk analysis and preparedness to mitigate against vulnerabilities and 
to build on already existing capacities; the importance of social capital and social cohesion in 
FCAS; and the importance of including local communities in peacebuilding and development 
processes. Yet while resilience (and ‘building back better’) is increasingly referred to in policy 
discussions and practices, important challenges remain in defining, understanding, analysing, 
and operationalising this framework in politically and technically feasible ways.  
Prevention – Conflict prevention and stabilisation approaches are increasingly integrated with 
this resilience framework, e.g. with both seeking to identify risks and reduce vulnerabilities to 
conflict and crisis. An important element of the prevention agenda is the need for mechanisms to 
allow greater synergies among diplomacy and mediation, security, and development activities. 
Lessons include: sustaining prevention activities over time to address structural issues, to 
strengthen institutions, and to adapt incentives; ensuring prevention activities are inclusive and 
build broad partnerships; and ensuring prevention activities proactively and directly target 
patterns of exclusion and institutional weaknesses that increase risks (UN & World Bank, 2018, 
p.xxvi). 
2. The development, humanitarian and peacebuilding 
nexus 
Debates about the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development aid 
emerged in the 1990s, and has continued to expand, in-line with broader changes in the 
international development agenda, moving from a predominant focus on aid and poverty to 
also include peacebuilding and state-building, fragile states, stabilisation and, more recently, 
radicalisation and extremism (Haider, 2014; Hinds, 2015; Herbert, 2017). The “triple nexus” 
concept now refers to the relationship between development, humanitarian and peacebuilding.  
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In situations of escalating conflict and fragility, development programming is typically 
diminished in favour of humanitarian programming (FAO, DI & NRC, 2021, p.vi) – this has 
broad impacts, e.g. on the type of modalities used to deliver programming (e.g. less budget 
support and more food aid), the type of actors involved in delivery (e.g. less engagement with the 
state, and more engagement with multilateral platforms and international non-governmental 
organisations), and other aspects like the thematic areas of programming,1 strategy, priorities, 
principles, cultures, mandates, timescales for engagement, etc (Ozano & Martineau, 2018; 
Hinds, 2014). As these policy debates evolve, strategies such as resilience and prevention have 
been proposed to ensure that these sectors are bridged, and that FCAS are not left behind. The 
OECD’s (2020, p.17) flagship annual report on fragile states argues that engagement in fragile 
contexts should “prioritise prevention always, development when possible and 
humanitarian action when necessary”.  
There is widespread acknowledgement of the need for better coordination between these 
areas to ensure e.g. that needs are met, and there are not gaps in programming and 
funding, that synergies are made across short-term humanitarian and longer-term development 
programming, and that programming in one area does not undermine programming in another. 
E.g. it is seen as critical for contexts like Somalia - that are heavily dependent on humanitarian 
assistance – to maintain development gains that have been achieved in previous years 
(Medinilla, et al., 2019). There has also been a recognition that humanitarian, development and 
security needs are inter-related, self-reinforcing and often occur concurrently, thus humanitarian, 
development and peace programming needs to be simultaneous, not sequenced (Herbert, 2014; 
FAO, DI & NRC, 2021, p.vii). 
Yet this is not without risks, linking development, security, with humanitarian work can 
undermine humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, can undermine the 
responsiveness and timeliness of emergency services, and pursuing principles of government 
ownership can mean working with agencies and actors that are perceived as illegitimate (Ozano 
& Martineau, 2018; Stoddard & Harmer, 2005). “Engaging humanitarian actors in discussions 
early on may help alleviate concerns and encourage productive communication”, find Ozano & 
Martineau (2018, p.2).  
Some criticise the merging of agendas as the “radicalisation of development”, while 
others argue it reflects the reality of doing development in FCAS (Duffield, 2014; Barakat & 
Waldman, 2013). This broadening, in specific contexts, has brought together ambitious and 
 
1 State-building domains in FCAS are often conceptualised into hierarchical categories of (Herbert, 2014; DFID, 
2009):  
• Essential state functions (also called ‘core’ or ‘survival’ state functions, or constitutive domains), which 
includes: the political settlement; security – monopoly of violence, justice and the rule of law; and basic 
administrative and fiscal capacity; and  
• Expected functions (also known as ‘output domains’), which includes: service delivery (health, 
education, water), infrastructure; economic management; employment programmes and job creation; 
personal safety and access to justice (beyond the basic level provided in state survival); social 
protection/safety nets; anti-corruption measures; and voice and accountability (e.g. fair elections, free 
media).  
Also see this useful guidance by USIP on what “stable governance” is, and key considerations for determining 
core functions of the state - https://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-
version/stable-governance  
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sometimes contradictory goals that can undermine what many people still consider to be the 
primary purpose of aid: poverty reduction.  
In order to mitigate against the negative tendencies of securitisation, Saferworld (2011, 
p.11) recommends a further “developmental-isation’ of the security discourse”, with the 
following steps:  
• Take an inclusive approach, based on human security, prioritising “the needs of people 
and the state, but always with an ultimate focus on the security of poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups”.  
• Make sure reforms are “locally-owned, informed by a good understanding of realities on 
the ground, and involve the meaningful participation of those they affect”. 
• Always begin with the context, as challenges and needs vary according to place and 
time, and as it is more effective to support and build on what already exists. 
• Co-ordinate and even integrate, but do not subsume development into defence and 
foreign policy. Coherent development, diplomatic, and defence policy should be aligned 
according to common goals and based on a shared understanding of the context, but 
should not be subsumed. 
The use and predominance of humanitarian or development systems and actors reflects 
the local context, but also the interests and incentives of international actors – e.g. 
competition between aid actors for dominance over agendas and/or budgets can disincentivise 
integration and effective cooperation (Medinilla, et al., 2019). This may be further complicated by 
the increased role played by non-DAC donors as they tend to engage much less in traditional 
multilateral coordinating mechanisms (Medinilla, et al., 2019). Other challenges include 
conceptual, institutional and strategic gaps between the different sectors/actors; lack of capacity 
and expertise to coordinate; lack of flexibility in funding arrangements; and funding gaps (Hinds, 
2015). Notably, funding limitations are likely to become even more challenging in the 
current context of COVID-19, as COVID-19 interventions and its indirect impacts strain local 
livelihoods, domestic resources for development, broader economic development trends, and 
international development budgets (Herbert & Marquette, 2021).  
The need for better coordination and integration across development, humanitarian and 
peacebuilding silos remains a crucial and “age-old challenge” (Medinilla, Shiferaw & Veron, 
2019). E.g. a review of the literature on health financing in FCAS found that the most discussed 
topic is aid coordination, and that “despite efforts to coordinate approaches across humanitarian 
and developmental settings, the literature remains distinct between them” (Bertone, Jowett, Dale 
& Witter, 2019). While multilateral organisations and bilateral agencies have made substantial 
policy-level advances in this thinking, practical implementation remains challenging (Medinilla, et 
al., 2019; FAO, DI & NRC, 2021).  
New Way of Working (NWOW) agenda to address the triple nexus 
The current UN agenda that addresses this nexus is called the ‘New Way of Working’ 
(NWOW), which is a “method of work” that connects to the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and draws on the G7+ New Deal’s principles (International Council of 
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Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 2017, p.1). It “calls on humanitarian and development actors to work 
collaboratively together, based on their comparative advantages, towards ‘collective outcomes’ 
that reduce need, risk and vulnerability over multiple years” (UN, n.d.), particularly in protracted 
crises. Key elements of the method are its focus on: collective outcomes, comparative 
advantage, and context specificity. It highlights that the approach requires changes in analysis, 
planning, programming, leadership and financing (UNOCHA, 2018, p.1). While this agenda may 
not seem that new, ICVA (2017) identifies new elements as the focus on shared goals 
(“collective outcomes”) over several years. They also highlight how it has evolved as a response 
to calls for a more coherent UN, and the World Bank is stepping up its work on fragility and 
conflict, and as there is a renewed global impetus to address the humanitarian-development gap 
(ICVA, 2017).  
In deciding who should be involved in designing the strategy, it highlights asking (UNOCHA, 
2018, p.4):  
1. What is the nature of the crisis? (e.g. conflict, disaster)  
2. What is the level of violence in cases of armed conflict? (e.g. high intensity, low intensity)  
3. Is there an emerging or established political settlement?  
4. What is the role and capacity of the government?  
It emphases the need to include consultation with affected communities and provisions for civil 
society actors to participate (UNOCHA, 2018, p.4). 
In how to define and articulate collective outcomes, it highlights (UNOCHA, 2018, p.4): 
1. Carry-out a joint humanitarian–development analysis of needs, vulnerabilities and risk, 
including the causes and impacts of a crisis. Then determine and prioritise a small 
number of areas that require simultaneous humanitarian and development action. All 
sources of data should be pooled. 
2. Determine the timeframe for work (ideally, between 3-5 years), taking into account other 
relevant planning timeframes. 
3. Based on a review of relevant national SDG objectives, determine what target would be 
appropriate for each collective outcome. 
In how to operationalise the outcomes, it highlights (UNOCHA, 2018, p.4-5):  
1. Bring together humanitarian–development nexus partners based on comparative 
advantages. 
2. Work backwards from each outcome to determine the activities required to achieve it. 
3. Identify which response priorities and activities are humanitarian and which are 
development-related, and which organizations can contribute particular programming to 
an identified collective outcome. 
4. Think through the sequencing and layering of short-, medium- and longer-term 
interventions according to people’s needs and vulnerabilities over the timeframe. 
5. Incorporate response priorities and activities in the relevant planning frameworks (e.g. 
humanitarian, development, government). If appropriate/useful, in a joint document. 
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6. Discuss the conditions needed for the interventions to be effective and actions to reach 
these conditions (e.g. increased government capacity, social safety net programmes). 
7. Secure flexible and predictable financing aimed at financing outcomes (not activities), 
and resourcing the actors required to achieve the collective outcome (e.g. UN entities, 
civil society, government, etc)  
8. Develop a results-based framework for collective outcomes that is aligned with relevant 
planning frameworks. The collective results-based framework could become the joint ac-
countability tool for humanitarian and development partners. 
NWOW in practice through the Deliver Accelerated Results Effectively and 
Sustainably (DARES) collaboration  
The Deliver Accelerated Results Effectively and Sustainably (DARES) (2017) collaboration 
brings together four organisations - UNICEF, World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP) and 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) – under an operational framework that builds on each 
organisation’s comparative advantages, and under a strategy emphasising prevention. The 
DARES (2017) approach is used in Yemen, and is also being piloted in a number of other 
countries where governments are non-functional, or are not in control of large parts of their 
respective countries, (e.g. Yemen, Somalia and Libya), and/or where a direct implementation 
model may be possible (i.e. a UN agency receiving IDA 18 funding, or from a Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund), and/or countries where the government has limited capacity (e.g. Central African Republic 
and Haiti). 
Frameworks for cooperation 
Donors in FCAS and partner governments are increasingly using frameworks to 
coordinate aid, strategy, resource mobilisation, and programming with other actors, e.g. 
including country platforms, joint assessments;2 compacts; peace agreements; financial 
frameworks,3 and donor conferences. While this has mostly been led by multilateral 
organisations (e.g. UN, World Bank), it is a more recent trend in bilateral donors’ approaches 
(Herbert, 2017). And there is increasing impetus for country platforms to be used more 
strategically in FCAS, building on the work of the New Deal, and now continuing into what 
appears to be a new paradigm based on a fragility-to-resilience framing (Ingram & Papoulidis, 
2018; Papoulidis, 2020a). “Country platforms must ultimately become a vehicle for more 
collaborative, resilient, adaptive and scalable approaches to help fragile states”, argues 
Papoulidis (2020a). Papoulidis (2020a) identifies a common (“aspirational”) model that many 
country platforms have: 
• “A high-level steering group led by Presidents or Prime-Ministers and comprised of senior 
multilateral and bilateral donor officials, implementing partners and representatives of 
civil society to help contribute to a national development plan, collective sense-making of 
the context, resource mobilization, mutual accountability and troubleshooting. 
 
2 E.g. the Recovery and Peace-Building Assessments (RPBAs), Post-Conflict (or Crisis) Needs Assessment 
(PCNA) 
3 E.g. UN-led Integrated National Financial Frameworks (INFF)  
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• A sector-level led by government ministers who assemble their own core sector groups of 
technical experts, operational partners and societal stakeholders to determine sector 
policy, resource flows and “who’s doing what where.”  
• A secretariat-level led by the Ministry of Planning and staffed by domestic and 
international experts with analytic, convening and troubleshooting roles to administer to 
the functioning of the steering and sector levels and facilitate achievement of overall 
development goals”. 
Two graphic depictions of the structures of country platforms in Somalia and Central Africa 
Republic are found in Figures 1 and 2 respectfully (Papoulidis, 2020a). 




See: Figure 2: Proposed Country Platform for the Central African Republic for its National 
Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA) and Mutual Commitment Framework (CEM-
RCA) (Government of Central African Republic, 2016 p.5, 
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/817461516999933538/pdf/122994-WP-PUBLIC-
CAR-RPBA.pdf; Papoulidis, 2020a, http://www.globaldeliveryinitiative.org/blogs/country-
platforms-fragile-states-new-path-development-cooperation) 
 
These frameworks “can help drive the significant change needed in the interaction and 
coherence of the security, political/diplomatic and humanitarian and development 
systems, helping to accelerate the reengagement of the private sector” (Thier, 2019, p.1). Yet 
although country platforms (under their various names) have been used for over two decades, 
they are “among the least examined and refined elements of development policy and practice” 
(Papoulidis, 2020b). Drawing on lessons from 10 years of compacts,4 Manuel, et al. (2017) 
highlight:  
• The compact must fit the country context;  
• Country ownership and participation in designing the compact increases the chance of 
success;  
• The level of national, sub-national and international capacities to manage and implement 
should be factored into compact design;  
• Compacts need to be understood and supported by the leadership, the legislature and 
other key locations of power;  
• Prioritisation and focus that balances vision and achievability is key;  
• Compact commitments and benchmarks should be specific, concrete, monitorable and 
balanced;  
• Mutual accountability needs to be two-sided;  
 
4 In Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Rwanda, 
Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia,  
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• Specific actions and support to strengthen government institutional effectiveness should 
be included, with the focus of effort onto compact priority areas synchronised with the 
approved plans of government; and  
• While compacts generally improve coordination, this can come with high transaction 
costs  
Lessons from Afghanistan’s first New Deal-type compact – agreed in 2006 – found that the 
compact “lacked prioritisation or focus, partly because the Afghan Cabinet was divided and 
each ministry, development agency and donor wanted its programme included in the Compact to 
safeguard its own funding”, found Manuel, et al. (2017, p.12). Its second compact (the Tokyo 
Mutual Accountability Framework for Afghanistan, 2012) addressed some of these problems, in 
being more selective than the previous compact, but yet it then faced criticism “for leaving out 
key determinants of stability and poverty reduction in Afghanistan, such as private sector 
development and employment, justice and limiting corruption” (Manuel, et al., 2017, p.12).  
Somalia’s New Deal Compact became its primary framework for aid coordination between 
development partners and Somalis for prioritisation, sequencing, aid effectiveness and 
coordination, while the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility became the major 
governance mechanism to coordinate aid around the compact (Hearn, 2016). In an independent 
review of the New Deal, Hearn (2016) identifies that the compact: lead to a more organised 
relationship between the international community and the government; was broadly owned and 
accepted by the government; and expedited a shift in planning and programming, from an 
exclusive focus on humanitarian action to a wider focus on peacebuilding and state-building. Yet 
challenges to the success of the compact include: low levels of consultation and adherence to 
the core principles of the compact; and the rushed development of the compact meant that only 
symbolic consultations were undertaken with civil society, parliament and sub-national political 
authorities (Hearn, 2016). Detailed analysis of the compact by Manuel, et al. (2017) identifies 
areas for new agreements:  
• Stronger focus on private sector issues 
• Renewed focus on ensuring all efforts are integrated and coherent  
• Faster progress on core financial and governance issues – especially on improving PFM 
coherence and coordination, tackling corruption, prioritising across all sources of finance 
and agreeing a roadmap for arrears clearance and debt relief.  
• Improved consultation processes to ensure the right balance between large consultative 
groups, supported by much greater investment in the translation of documents and 
smaller groups for ongoing honest exchange.  
Country-led strategies when legitimacy is contested? 
In general, the largest share of development finance in protracted crises is channelled to 
recipient governments, however, this is complex when the legitimacy of political actors is 
challenged (e.g. as in Somalia), and where government structures are weak or unresponsive to 
local populations (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Development Initiatives (DI) & 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2021)). Particularly in these cases, important entry points 
emerge around partnerships with local governments, through local governance programmes, 
and, in some cases, bypassing national ministries (FAO, DI & NRC, 2021, p.vi; Ozano & 
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Martineau, 2018). Ozano and Martineau (2018, p.3) highlight “the need to identify concepts and 
methods for working with pluralistic, under-governed, transnational health systems”. 
3. A new fragile states paradigm? 
The fragile states agenda has been the dominant framing and forum over the past decade 
for how international actors can engage in FCAS. Key critiques of that agenda include: 
that it has favoured: transplanting best-practices from one context to another (the good 
governance agenda), without sufficient understanding of the context; short-term, uncoordinated, 
one-off projects rather than sustainable engagement; the promotion of economic growth and 
poverty eradication over crisis management; and the idea of a fragile/non-fragile binary (Ingram 
& Papoulidis, 2018; World Bank, 2017).  
In recognition of these limitations, the debates around the fragile states agenda are 
evolving in various ways, e.g. away from a fragile/non-fragile binary towards a multidimensional 
understanding of fragility; away from ideas of best practice to a focus on “what works while also 
recognising what does not work”; away from ad hoc, disjointed investments to country platforms 
for development cooperation; away from a poverty and growth focus, to a focus on risk and 
resilience; and new focus areas including: resilience, adaptive development, addressing political 
problems, collective action, and scaling (Ingram & Papoulidis, 2018; OECD, 2020; Papoulidis, 
2020b). One of the more recent forums created the five principles of the Bellagio Consensus: 
“keeping politics at the centre; local ownership; a transition from donor-led, many 
priorities to country-led, few priorities; inclusion and engagement from idea to 
implementation; and confidence-building along the way” (Thier, 2019, p.1). 
Centrality of politics 
The importance of acknowledging the centrality of politics in state- and peace-building 
processes, and the complexity of working politically, is reiterated throughout the literature 
(e.g. UN & World Bank, 2017). A key critique of the fragile states agenda is that it represented a 
technocratic view of such reforms, and this is also a critique levelled at the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), where discussions about conflict, inequity, or lack of human rights 
and justice were “conspicuously avoided” (Lindborg, 2017, p.3).  
Drawing on fieldwork in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan on the delivery of health, education, 
and rural infrastructure services, the World Bank (2017, p.xiv) finds that research and 
programming needs to go beyond “overly simplistic” classifications of violence, and broad, high-
level principles, to really unpack context specific political economy and violence risks in service 
delivery. In highlights the importance of understanding the “specific characteristics of political 
settlements at various levels, the different dimensions of violence, the processes and forms of 
bargaining and strategies of delivery” to understand better the variation in the success of service 
delivery programming (World Bank, 2017, p.xvii). Meanwhile, Thier (2019, p.8-9) recommends 
keeping politics at the centre of programming through:  
• Cultivating a vanguard of change in key countries and institutions by making sure there is 
support for actors in the institutions and systems – local, national and international – that 
will ultimately be responsible for driving change. This can be done by setting incentives to 
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motivate those actors and their institutions, and creating networks to share learning and 
experience. 
• Looking for pivotal moments to make progress on new approaches. 
• Setting the frame for a common agenda that is relevant to grassroots perspectives, 
national leaders and international actors. 
• Introducing iterative approaches and adaptive management to ensure tight feedback 
loops between action, monitoring, learning and adapting. 
• Developing an influence strategy and build a bigger coalition, getting more stakeholders 
on board 
There is a vibrant literature on how to think and work politically. This query does not have time to 
go into this in depth.5 See also UN and World Bank (2017) for guidance on how to (re)build core 
government functions in FCAS by each domain. 
4. The resilience agenda  
Resilience thinking has emerged from the livelihoods and disaster risk and resilience literatures, 
and in more recent years, has become a core concept in the fields of peacebuilding, conflict 
sensitivity, and state-building. Resilience is now often seen as an important contributing 
factor to explain why some societies are particularly vulnerable to violence, while others 
experience protracted periods of peace (e.g. OECD, 2020, Menkhaus, 2013). This may herald 
a new fragility-to-resilience paradigm (Ingram & Papoulidis, 2018; OECD, 2020).  
Interpeace’s concept of “resilience for peace”, places conflict at the centre of its analysis, and 
understands resilience as: “the diverse endogenous attributes, capacities, resources and 
responses, that potentially enable individuals, communities, institutions and societies to deal 
peacefully with the impact of past conflict and violence, as well as to prevent new and emerging 
patterns of conflict and violence” (Simpson, Makoond, Vinck and Pham, 2016, p.9). A key 
understanding through this lens is that resilience, conflict, and peacebuilding have multiple 
connections, e.g. these include (McCandless and Nilus-Tarp, 2015, p.6; Simpson, et al., 2016; 
Fan, 2016):  
• Conflict can be a distinct shock, stress, and risk that harms, decreases or undermines 
resilience directly and indirectly; 
• Conflict can be a symptom of a lack of resilience;  
• The intersection of conflict, disasters and fragility are manifold and can be mutually 
reinforcing; 
• Resilient societies are better able to withstand the effects of conflict; 
• Conflict can provoke a rupture in the system which can open up new opportunities for 
resilience (if and when there are capacities to transform); 
• Peacebuilding can support and build resilience through strengthening the capacities of 
individuals, households, communities, states, etc, to absorb, adapt, and transform. 
 
55 E.g. further reading is recommended around the thinking and working politically (TWP) community, the Doing 
Development Differently community, and around political economy analysis thinking, etc. 
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Risk and vulnerability  
Resilience is directly shaped by the vulnerabilities and capacities that one has when 
facing a crisis – therefore risk analysis and preparedness is key. The resilience lens is 
proposed as a means to foster a more complex understanding of how risks emanating from 
disasters, conflict, and poverty interact and reinforce one another, and how to leverage resilient 
capacities for fragile political settlements (e.g. Ingram and Papoulidis, 2018; Opitz-Stapleton, 
Nadin, Kellett, Calderone, Quevedo, Peters, & Mayhew, 2019; Fan, 2016). This means a move 
away from seeing conflict as the only or main risk, to understanding conflict as one among many 
complex, overlapping risks, a key finding from 10 years of Secure Livelihoods Research 
Consortium (SLRC) research (Papoulidis, 2021). This underlines the importance of conducting 
complex risk assessments (Papoulidis, 2021; Opitz-Stapleton, et al., 2019).  
Complexity 
Using resilience as a lens, rather than a label, reinforces the idea that resilience is not an end-
point, nor a certainty, or a clear binary category to be identified. This responds to the complexity 
agenda. And learns from the critiques of the failed state and fragile state agendas where those 
labels, the comparative indexes, and fragility lists arguably supported a too simplistic view of 
state fragility, lacking in nuance and context specificity (Lemay-Hébert, 2019). This agenda is 
also critiqued for overlooking the complex interplay of risk and capacity (Van Metre, 2016).  
Social capital 
Social capital, and social cohesion, are key concepts that underpin resilience. Social capital can 
be understood as having different dimensions (Downen, Mueller & Frankenberger, 2019, p.3): 
• Bonding social capital comprise the bonds between community members;  
• Bridging social capital connects members of one community or group to other 
communities or groups; and  
• Linking social capital is seen in trusted social networks between individuals and groups 
interacting across explicit, institutionalized, formal boundaries in society.   
Ingram and Papoulidis (2018) note that incorporating social capital “as an organising 
principle into large-scale development programs, like the Afghanistan Basic Package on 
Health Services or Ethiopia’s productive safety net, social capital can strengthen the norms and 
networks between fragmented communities and institutions to better mitigate risks and cope with 
crisis. When focused on greater empowerment and inclusion of women, social capital can 
increase their entry into wider markets and support peace efforts through bridging efforts across 
divided communities and links to formal institutions.” 
Role of local communities 
The resilience lens has emerged from more bottom-up, participatory forms of development – 
such as the livelihoods sector. Thus in the typically state-centric fragility agenda, it is considered 
to provide an important heuristic shift by refocusing attention on the positive attributes of 
states and societies and on the particular needs and capacities of local communities (Van 
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Metre, 2016). Lessons from interventions in FCAS during the past decade demonstrate that 
donors have often focused on states and institutional capacities, rather than the realities of local 
communities. Rather than emphasising weakness, failure and fragility, resilience views the local 
and culture as a resource to be used positively in peacebuilding processes (Joseph & Juncos, 
2019). A key implication from ten years of SLRC research is that international actors need a 
greater understanding of the strength and type of coping capacities, with the commitment to 
better recognise and support existing coping capacities (Papoulidis, 2021). 
In contexts like Somalia, where humanitarians, the private sector, and clan networks are long-
term providers of basic services, state-building needs to be approached from top and 
bottom at the same time, without a default to community driven development only, finds 
Medinilla, et al. (2019). Indeed, Medinilla, et al. (2019) identify that “the real starting point for 
nexus approaches may well be at the local level”.  
While Ozano and Martineau (2018, p.3) highlight a positive example from Afghanistan when 
local partners were involved in needs assessments and decision-making processes on 
health programmes. This inclusion resulted in changes to “educational materials for rural 
populations, religious awareness in gender groupings for health educational interventions and 
recruitment of local staff, educated in languages and customs” (Ozano & Martineau, 2018, p.3). 
Conceptual proliferation? 
Yet while the concepts of resilience, and ‘building back better’, are playing increasingly important 
roles in academic and policy literature, and in policymakers and practitioners thinking and 
practices, an important challenge is the limited consensus on how to define, understand, 
analyse, and operationalise it. Indeed, there are a large number of overlapping concepts that 
have linkages to resilience and conflict resilience within the broad security-development-
humanitarian nexus. It is important to draw connections and lessons to ensure that the 
discussions about resilience move these debates forward, and that it does not just become 
another buzzword (Simpson, et al., 2016). While building resilience is increasingly seen as 
important in FCAS, it is a relatively new concept in this area, and thus work is needed to 
determine its added value from overlapping concepts (Runde & Savoy, 2014). Work is also 
needed to translate it into action that is both politically and technically feasible for international 
actors (Herbert & Marquette, 2021). Thus far, the resilience agenda is credited is having had 
“notable success” in managing major crises relating to food security and disaster risk reduction, 
however this has not yet been broadened to “promote country-wide resilience in the face of 
complex risks, which is precisely what is needed to exit fragility”, argue Ingram and Papoulidis 
(2018). 
5. Prevention 
The resilience lens is being increasingly adopted in conflict prevention and stabilisation 
approaches, with important overlaps (Ingram and Papoulidis, 2018). E.g. the US Government’s 
(2020) global fragility strategy puts a major emphasis on prevention and stabilisation, but it 
implicitly places both within a resilience framework  
The prevention agenda can be understood as including approaches to avoid, minimise, and/or 
contain potential violent conflicts; and in post-conflict environments, to prevent violent conflict 
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from re-emerging (Haider, 2014). Both conflict prevention and resilience building seek to identify 
risks (e.g. of an outbreak or relapse into conflict), and to reduce the vulnerabilities of certain 
actors or systems to those risks. Long term preventive institutions and mechanisms overlap with 
approaches adopted in the aftermath of conflict in order to prevent a renewal of violence (Haider, 
2014); with peacebuilding approaches; and with the systemic transformation view of resilience. 
Prevention efforts ideally comprise a continuum of mutually reinforcing actions, from 
early monitoring and action on risks, to consistent strengthening of social resilience 
(World Bank, 2018). Early warning systems – one among many tools for conflict prevention – 
include: data collection, risk analysis, transmission of alert, recommendations, and monitoring 
and evaluation. They are used to design timely and appropriate conflict prevention initiatives, 
usually undertaken during latent stages of perceived potential conflict (Haider, 2014). 
Coordination between civil society, local and national authorities, and international organisations 
is important so that warning signs can be detected and dealt with before they escalate. Local 
groups are well placed to identify early signs of violence (Saferworld, n.d.). 
The flagship Pathways for Peace paper by the UN and World Bank (2018, p.236) connects the 
agendas by arguing that “preventing fragility, conflict and violence is central to reducing 
poverty and achieving shared prosperity” (p.xi, emphasis added), and that “addressing 
inequalities and exclusion, making institutions more inclusive, and ensuring that development 
strategies are risk-informed are central to preventing the fraying of the social fabric that could 
erupt into crisis” (UN & World Bank, 2018, p.xviii).  
An important element of the prevention agenda is the need for mechanisms to allow greater 
synergy “among the various tools and instruments of prevention, in particular, diplomacy and 
mediation, security, and development” (UN & World Bank, 2018, p.xix). In terms of what has 
worked for managing contestation and preventing violent conflict, the UN and World Bank (2018, 
p.xix) highlight three areas: shaping the incentives of actors for peace, reforming 
institutions to foster inclusion, and addressing structural factors that feed into 
grievances.  
The UN and World Bank (2018, p.xxv) identify three principles for prevention:  
• Prevention must be sustained over time to address structural issues 
comprehensively, strengthen institutions, and adapt incentives for actors to manage 
conflict without violence. It should not be seen as a trade-off between the short and long 
term. This requires sustained investment in all risk environments, the integration of 
development investments into overarching strategies with politically viable short- and 
medium-term actions, and balancing resources so that action does not reward only crisis 
management 
• Prevention must be inclusive and build broad partnerships across groups to 
identify and address grievances that fuel violence, while not focusing just on those that 
control the means of violence and positions of power. This highlights the importance of 
understanding people, their experiences, their communities, and the local context. 
• Prevention must proactively and directly target patterns of exclusion and 
institutional weaknesses that increase risk. Successful prevention depends on pro-
active and targeted action before, during, and after violence.  
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For better alignment between peace, security, and development actors, the UN and World Bank 
(2018, p.xxvi) recommend: 
• Ensuring security and development approaches are compatible and mutually supportive  
• Building capacity and allocating resources to ensure that grievances are mediated 
quickly and transparently  
• Engaging actors beyond the state in platforms for dialogue and peacebuilding  
• Adopting a people-centred approach  
To overcome barriers to cooperation, the UN and World Bank (2018, p.xxvi) recommend:  
• Sharing risk assessments  
• Committing to collective mechanisms to identify and understand risks at regional, 
country, and subnational levels  
• Ensuring that joint risk assessments articulate jointly agreed priorities  
• Building stronger regional and global partnerships  
• Exploring new investment approaches for prevention 
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